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TAMING TERRORISTS
BUT NOT "NATURAL BORN KILLERS"
by S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy I
It may seem surprising, but there are many publications available for

purchase which provide explicit instructions on how to perform acts which can
only be described as criminal, and from which no social good comes.2 Not
surprisingly, some of the individuals who have read these publications put the
ideas contained in the material into action. The victims have decided that civil
lawsuits against the publishers of this material would help deter its publication
and the subsequent harm it causes. In response, the publishers have argued that
the First Amendment protects them from such lawsuits. Should this material
receive such a high level of First Amendment protection that the publisher is
immune from these civil lawsuits?
Consider, for example, a book providing detailed instructions on how to
construct, place and detonate an explosive device to wreak maximum havoc in a
public place. A publisher that prints and distributes such a book, is at best
grossly indifferent to the prospect that such publications will result in harm to
others. Under the common law of torts, you might expect that the victims of
such an act could recover damages from the publisher, either for an intentional
tort or negligence.3 The First Amendment, however, has been used to block the
I.
Associate Professor, University of Cincinnati College of Law; J. D., 1991 Duke Law School;
B.A., 1988, College of William and Mary. Many thanks to the staff of the Northern Kentucky Law
Review for their help with this article.
2.
Many such "how to" manuals are now easily available to the public. For an illustrative
listing of some of the available books describing how to engage in criminal activity, see Amitai
Etzioni, Is Information on How to Make a Bomb More Harmful than Porn?, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 31
(August 24, 1995) (listing numerous books available through mail order, including the following:
Be Your Own Undertaker: How to Dispose of a Dead Body; Deadly Brew: Advanced Improvised
Explosives; The Ancient Art of Strangulation; The Poor Man's Sniper Rifle; 21 Techniques of
Silent Killing; The Home and Recreational Use of High Explosives; Kill Without Joy: The
Complete How-to-Kill Book; Guerrilla's Arsenal: Advanced Techniques for Making Explosives
and Time-Delay Bombs; Ultimate Sniper; The Big Book of Mischief; Silent But Deadly: More
Homemade Silencers from Hayduke the Master; How to Build Practical Firearm Suppressors: An
Illustrated Step-by-Step Guide; and The Terrorist Handbook).
3.
See W. PAGE KEETON. ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (discussing
the elements of neglience). For example, if a negligent physical act causes injury, the tort-feasor,
absent a defense, is usually liable. Id. at 165. If, however, that same injury is the result of some
form of speech, the First Amendment may insulate the tort-feasor from liability. See, e.g., Cardozo
v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (plaintiff injured as a result of cookbook's
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imposition of tort liability in such cases.4 Because a victim's ability to recover
remains doubtful under current law, a would-be publisher of such material faces
very little deterrent to publishing and disseminating it.
As a matter of basic economics, it is not logical that the victim of a horrible
crime shoulder the social costs of a book providing instruction to the perpetrator
of that crime. In the absence of the First Amendment, establishing liability
would be relatively easy. Tort law would allow victims to recover for the social
harms associated with the criminal activity.
The critical question is why should the First Amendment preclude the
application of traditional tort principles in this type of situation? What
redeeming purpose do these publications serve that outweighs the need for a
government to protect citizens? Such information is far removed from the good
faith criticism of public officials that lies at the heart of New York Times v.
SullivanS and its progeny. It makes sense to protect the press from government
censorship or undue influence. Protecting criticism of public officials and public
figures serves core concerns of the First Amendment. Protecting those who
advocate or teach criminal behavior does not. 6
Because plaintiffs can recover damages for certain speech activities - i.e.,
fraud, solicitation, and defamation - it is surprising that courts have not acted to
regulate speech that advocates or facilitates harm to others. 7 If the First
Amendment permits liability for the nonphysical harm of defamation, then the
inadequate warnings regarding poisonous ingredients used in recipe), cert. denied, 353 So. 2d 674
(Fla. 1977). The First Amendment applies because common law tort liability is a form of state
action. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,265 (1964) (declaring that "[t]he test
is not the form in which state power has been applied, but, whatever the fonn, whether such power
has in fact been exercised."). Although this article argues that the First Amendment should not bar
liability for hann advocacy speech, it does not suggest that it is completely inapplicable. Cf W.
Tarver Rountree, Constitutional Law, 33 MERCER L. REV. 51, 63 (1981); Donald Wallis,
"Negligent Publishing "; Implications for University Publishers, 9 J.C. & U.L. REV. 209, 225
( 1982).
4.
See infra notes 11-119 and accompanying text.
5.
See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
6.
Note also that imposing liability for speech that advocates harm is entirely viewpoint neutral:
the aims or objectives of the publisher are irrelevant to the question of imposing liability for the
social hann resulting from the speech.
7.
For a full discussion of the impact of the Sullivan case, see BRUCE W. SANFORD, DON'T
SHOOT THE MESSENGER: How OUR GROWING HATRED OF THE MEDIA THREATENS FREE SPEECH FOR
ALL OF US 176-79 (1999).
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First Amendment should also certainly permit liability in tort when publications
facilitate physical injury or death.
Nevertheless, courts confronted with cases involving instructional speech
that advocates or facilitates criminal behavior have concluded that such speech
enjoys strong First Amendment protection. 8 Free speech undoubtedly imposes
social costs on the community.9 The fact that someone engages in speech
activity or expressive conduct does not automatically insulate them from liability
for the social harms caused by their speech activity or expressive conduct. The
question is more subtle: sometimes the costs are taxed against the speaker, and
other times they are not.
This squarely presents the question of whether and when the government
may assign the social costs of speech activities against speakers. Someone
falsely shouting "fire" in a crowded theater can be made to pay, whereas the
street minister who distributes leaflets which are later dropped on the street
creating aesthetic blight, cannot. Between these two points lies a continuum.
This Article will explore the possibility of shifting or sharing the liability
stemming from criminal activities to those who provide detailed directions on
how to commit those acts, when the publication in question has no other
redeeming value. This Article concludes that in some limited circumstances, the
First Amendment should not preclude the imposition of civil liability for those
who write and distribute speech that both advocates and facilitates harm to
others.IO
Part I of this Article reviews the First Amendment and discusses the
Brandenburg test and its potential application to situations involving speech
advocating socially harmful activity. Part II argues that this approach is poorly
suited for dealing with the problems inherent in such harm-promoting speech.
By accommodating only considerations that arise from the imminence of the
harm, and not the nature of the speech itself, the courts have not permitted
individuals to recover in tort for harm proximately caused by such speech and
8.
See infra notes 11-119 and accompanying text.
9.
For an excellent discussion of the need to re-think whether victims of speech-related hanns
should be required to "pay the price" of free speech, see Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free
Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1325 (1992) (arguing that once we uncouple the freedom of
speech from the compensation (literally or figuratively) of the victim, we will see).
10. For a discussion of some of these concepts, see S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Ronald 1.
Krotoszynski, Jr., Recalibrating the Cost of Harm Advocacy: Getting Beyond Brandenburg, WM &
MARY L. REV. (2000).

HeinOnline -- 27 N. Ky. L. Rev. 83 2000

84

NORTHERN KENTUCKY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:1

intended by the speaker to cause such hann. Part III suggests that the
recognition of this new category of speech would pennit courts to better address
the conflict between society's need to protect its citizens from violence and the
First Amendment value of free expression and democratic deliberation.
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND MEDIA VIOLENCE

The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom. of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."11 In tum,
the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause incorporates a free speech
guarantee identical to the First Amendment's guarantee.1 2 The text, although
important, does not on its face resolve specific free speech questions: the precise
scope of "the freedom of speech" is something that reviewing courts must
resolve on a case-by-case basis. 13
The contemporary First Amendment speech categories do not adequately
address the social costs associated with speech intended to facilitate anti-social
behavior. When addressing the damage from speech that advocates hann, the
federal courts routinely have applied the Brandenburg test, a test designed to
protect political speech and the abstract advocacy of violence or revolution. 14
Brandenburg holds that speech cannot be the basis for civil or criminal sanctions
unless it both advocates lawless conduct and poses a grave risk of actually
inciting imminent hann. 15 Because instructional books, songs, and movies do

II.

U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment is made applicable to the states through the

Fourteenth Amendment. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).

12.

See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,707 (1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,666

(1925). The Fourteenth Amendment states that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the Unites States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; or deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I; see also
Toni Massaro, Reviving Hugo Black? The Court's "Jot for Jot" Account of Substantive Due
Process, 73 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1086 (1998).
13. See WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 21-49
(1984).

14. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
15. /d. at 447. In Brandenburg, the Court offered extremely broad protection to political dissent
and required that the government meet three different criteria to regulate such speech. First, the
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not usually by their nature prompt individuals to immediate action, such
materials generally will not meet Brandenburg's imminent harm requirement.
This test demands that the harmful speech cause an individual to act on impulse,
without rational thought. 16 That is to say, Brandenburg addresses speech
activity designed to persuade someone to immediately engage in an unlawful
act, not speech designed to facilitate the commission of an unlawful act by a
person who has already decided to act.
Applying Brandenburg, courts generally have held speech advocating harm
to be constitutionally protected expression, thereby denying any effective
remedy to injured plaintiffs. To address speech that does not produce imminent
harm but nevertheless advocates harm in a fashion that directly facilitates the
realization of the harm (perhaps at some later time), courts should develop a new
category of speech that more appropriately weighs society's interest in
protecting its citizens from socially harmful activities against the First
Amendment's protection of free expression. As explained more thoroughly
below, Brandenburg, properly understood, does not address speech that attempts
to facilitate or assist lawless action, but rather governs abstract exhortations to
lawless action which might incite a sufficiently susceptible person to action. I 7
speaker must promote not just any lawless action, but "imminent" lawless action. Id. at 447.
Second, the imminent lawless action must be highly "likely" to occur. Id. Third, the speaker must
intend to produce imminent lawless action. Id. (stating that the speech must be '~directed to
inciting or producting imminent lawless action").

16. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447-48 ("constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press
do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action"); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961) ("the mere
abstract teaching . . . of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and
violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action.").
17. See id. at 447; see, e.g., Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding
that a magazine article on "auto-erotic asphyxiation" did not incite adolescent to perfonn act that
led to death by hanging since the article included several warnings, and imposition of civil liability
would violate First Amendment); Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536 N.E.2d 1067,
1071 (Mass. 1989) (holding that a film depicting gang life did not constitute unprotected
incitement because, "[a]lthough ... rife with violent scenes, it [did] not at any point exhort, urge,
entreat, solicit, or ... encourage unlawful or violent activity"); McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 202 Cal.
App. 3d 989, 100 I (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that "there is nothing in ... [the] songs which
could be characterized as a command to an immediate suicidal act").
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Thus, Brandenburg speaks only to the specific subject of speech advocating
hann, and not to the entire category of media violence. 18
A. The Brandenburg Clear and Present Danger/Imminence Test

The Supreme Court announced the current general test for advocacy of
lawless action in Brandenburg v. Ohio. 19 Clarence Brandenburg was a leader of
the Ku Klux Klan ("KKK") who had invited the local press to attend a KKK
rally.2 0 At the rally, he gave a somewhat incoherent speech in which he
proclaimed that the KKK was "not a revengent organization, but if our President,
our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian
race, it's possible that there might have to be some revengeance taken."21 As a
result of his speech, the defendant was arrested for advocating criminal activity
in violation of Ohio law. 22
In reversing the defendant's conviction, the Supreme Court revised the "clear
and present danger" test. 23 The Court recognized that the then predominant

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See generally Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
See id. at 444-45.
Id. at 446.
Id. at 445. The statute at issue in that case prohibited:
"[A]dvocat[ing] ... the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or
unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform
. . . and voluntarily assembl[ing] with any society, group, or assemblage of persons
fonned to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism." Id. (quoting OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.13 (repealed 1974».

23.

Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. The clear and present danger test was first articulated in

Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (stating that "[t]he question in every case is
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent."). See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (stating
that speech cannot be restricted under clear and present danger test unless it "would produce or is
intended to produce, a clear and imminent danger of some substantive evil which the State
constitutionally may seek to prevent."), overruled in part by, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969).

The traditional clear and present danger test was relied upon to uphold government

suppression of political speech on a number of occasions. See, e.g., Frohwerk v. United States,
249 U.S. 204 (1919); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upholding conviction of
members of Communist Party, which advocated violent overthrow offederal government).
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clear and present danger test allowed the government to suppress undesirable
political views simply by invoking the speech's "tendency to lead to violence."24
To ensure greater protection of political speech and less opportunity for
government pretext, the Brandenburg Court focused on whether the speech at
issue presented a temporally imminent danger, stating:
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of
law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action.25
The Court emphasized that, "the mere abstract teaching . . . of the moral
propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the
same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action. "26
Thus, under Brandenburg, advocacy of violence can be prohibited only when a
speaker (1) advocates imminent illegal conduct; (2) intends to incite either the
use of force or illegal conduct; and (3) is highly likely to incite such conduct. 27
Applying this test, the Court found that the words spoken by the Klansman
amounted to mere abstract advocacy of lawlessness.28 Accordingly, the Ohio
statute that purported to punish such speech was itselfunconstitutionaI.29
Since Brandenburg, the imminence requirement has become the central
focus of the test. 30 For instance, in Hess v. Indiana,31 the Court reversed the
conviction of an anti -war demonstrator who yelled, "[w]e' 11 take the fucking

24. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447; see also Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973). This
concern relates back to cases applying the clear and present danger test in a relatively weak fonn.
See. e.g.. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). Justice Douglas so feared a "bad
tendencies" understanding of the clear and present danger test that he rejected the test entirely as
being too unreliable in affording protection to core political speech. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at
453 (Douglas, J., concurring).
25. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
26. Id. at 448.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 448-49.
29. Id. at 449.
30. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886

(1982).
31. 414 U.S. 105 (1973).

HeinOnline -- 27 N. Ky. L. Rev. 87 2000

88

NORTHERN KENTUCKY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27: I

street later (or again)."32 The Court held that this language amounted at most to
the "advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time. "33 Because the
evidence showed that Hess's statement was an exclamation rather than being
directed specifically at any group, and because no evidence existed that his
statement was intended and likely to produce imminent disorder, the statement
enjoyed constitutional protection. 34
Similarly, in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Company,35 the Supreme
Court set aside an award of damages based on a NAACP boycott of white
merchants,36 In the course of the boycott, one NAACP official had proclaimed
in a public speech that "[i]f we catch any of you going in any of them racist
stores, we're gonna break your damn neck."37 The Court acknowledged that the
speaker in question had used strong language, but concluded that the speech
essentially was an impassioned plea for support of the boycott. 38 Nevertheless,
if actual outbreaks of violence had followed, the Court suggested that a
substantial question would exist regarding whether the speaker could be held
liable for the resulting damages,39 Because the only outbreaks of violence took
place weeks or months. later, the Court held that no liability could attach.40
Advocates must be free to make spontaneous emotional appeals without
carefully weighing their words, and such appeals constitute protected speech
when they do not immediately incite lawless action. 41
32. See Id. Hess involved a statement made during a protest by one of the protesters that "We'll
take the fucking street later." Id. at 106. The statement was made while the protesters were
dispersing. /d. at 107. The speech clearly advocated an illegal action. Id. at 108. However, the
Court held that although the statement advocated an illegal action, it advocated such an action at an
undefined future date. Id. It was not an action to be taken in the near future, and thus did not meet
the imminence requirement. Id. at 108-09.
33. Id. at 108.
34. Id. at 108-09.

35.

458 U.S. 886 (1982).

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
/d. at 902.
Id. at 928.
Id.
/d.
41.
Id. In addition, the Court noted that the speaker tempered his impassioned rhetoric with the
following remarks: "I am not going to layout in the bushes and shoot no white folks. That's
wrong. I am not gonna go out here and bomb none of them's home. That's not right. ... Be
courteous now. Don't mistreat nobody. Tell them in a nice forceful way, the curfew is going to be
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One should note that none of these cases involve efforts to teach listeners
how to commit specific illegal acts against particular persons or groups.42
Neither the Klan, the anti-war protestor, nor the NAACP were conducting a
seminar in how to make and successfully toss a Molotov cocktai1. 43 When
speech activity is hyperbolic and advocates some ambiguous lawless action at an
indefinite time in the future, it presents very little real risk to the community.44
The social cost of such speech activity is de minimis.45

on until they do what we ask them." [d. at 939.
42. See supra notes 17-35 and accompanying text.
43.

[d.

44. See generally Bradenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444; Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105; NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co, 458 U.S. 886.
45. Of course, the effects of hate speech can be very real to members of targeted communities.
See, e.g., MARl J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE
SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 20 (1993). The First Amendment's free speech guarantee has
generally afforded speakers immunity from liability for psychological harm, even when a speaker
deliberately sets out to bring about such harm. See Hustler v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988);
Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1206, 1210 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978); cf
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 265-67 (1952) (holding that protection of liberty as defined
by the due process clause does not prevent punishment of criminal libel directed at certain groups).
For democratic deliberation to occur, some measure of psychologiCal hann to members of the
community must be accepted as a necessary consequence of the project of self-governance.
Whether the Supreme Court has struck an appropriate balance on the question of how much
psychological harm must be tolerated is a matter that legal scholars are hotly contesting. See, e.g.,
RICHARD DELGADO AND JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS:
HATE SPEECH,
PORNOGRAPHY AND THE NEW FIRST AMENDMENT 10-11 (1997); CATHERINE MACKINNON,
ONLY WORDS (1993) (arguing that pornography or "graphic sexually explicit materials," should
not fall within the protective bounds of the First Amendent); Steven G. Gey, Postmodern
Censorship Revisited: A Reply to Richard Delgado, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1077 (1998) (arguing
against the creation of a "hate speech" category of unprotected speech). Moreover, Europe and
Canada have struck radically different balances. See Frances H. Foster, Translating Freedomfor
Post-1997 Hong Kong, 76 WASH. U. L. Q. 113 (1998). For present purposes, this article assumes
that the First Amendment precludes relief for harms of the sort described in Beauharnais and
Falwell. These harms, while real, are not the result of Hann Advocacy and thereforeHe beyond
the scope of this article.
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B. The Implications of Brandenburg for Media Violence

The Brandenburg test quite appropriately makes it difficult for the
government to restrict or suppress political speech.46 It does not, however,
establish an absolute bar to government regulation of speech activity.47 Rather,
it creates a strong presumption that the First Amendment protects the mere
advocacy of lawlessness;48 Although the Brandenburg test clearly recognizes
the government's compelling interest in safeguarding the safety of citizens, it
generally rejects the government's invocation of this interest when the speech in
question involves dissident political views. 49 Thus, the requirement that the
alleged lawlessness take place or be likely to take place almost immediately after
the delivery of the speech ensures that the danger is in fact not speculative and
that the government's interest in preventing the violence is not pretextual.
Conversely, if speech aims to facilitate a particular lawless act against a
discrete victim or group of victims, the government's claim of concern sounds
far more plausible on its face. Suppressing unpopular political minorities is one
thing,preventing the bombing of federal buildings or abortion clinics is quite
another. In the context of abstract political speech by unpopular political
minorities, Brandenburg'S imminence test makes a great deal of sense. Purely
speculative harms are not sufficient grounds for censorship. But when the nature
of the speech itself creates a palpable danger, the government's concerns sound
less in censorship and more in the viewpoint neutral cadence of the public
safety. 50 Indeed, landmark Supreme Court cases suggest that Brandenburg

46. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444.
47. /d.
48. Id.
49. See generally STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE AND MEANINGS OF AMERICA (1999)
(arguing that dissent is the core of the First Amendment). Another possible explanation is that
incitement to imminent lawlessness, like fighting words, induces listeners to react impulsively.
Under this theory, regulating such speech would therefore not implicate the listeners' autonomy.
50. See generally United States v. New York Times, 403 U.S. 7\3, 718 (1971) (per curiam)
(Black, J. concurring) (language on publishing troop transport infonnation is not protected by the
First Amendment and may indeed be subject to a prior restraint). See also United States v.
Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 999-1000 (W.O. Wis. 1979) (granting temporary injunction
against Progressive Magazine to prohibit publication of an article containing material on how the
H-bomb w:orked); Morland v. Sprecher, 443 U.S. 709 (1979). For a further discussion of the
Progressive case, see Erwin Knoll, National Security: The Ultimate Threat to the First
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should not be stretched to confer blanket protection on speech that advocates
hann to others. 5 I
II. TORT LIABILITY, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FEDERAL COURTS

In New York Times Company v. Sullivan,52 the Supreme Court severely
limited the right of individuals to sue publishers in the event a publication is
defamatory. 53 A would-be public figure or public officer plaintiff must show
"actual malice," that is knowledge of falsity or reckless indifference to truth or
falsity, in order to recover damages from a media defendant. 54 Although the
Court also recognized that the imposition of tort liability based on a defendant's
speech constitutes state action, 55 and that the imposition of liability may have a

Amendment, 66 MINN. L. REV. 161 (1981); L.A. Powe, Jr., The H-Bomb Injunction, 61 U. COLO.
L. REV. 55 (1990).
51. See United States v. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam). In United
States v. New York Times Company, also known as the "Pentagon Papers Case," a clear majority of
the justices made clear that the First Amendment did not privilege the publication of military
secrets, at least when publication of the infonnation would put service people in immediate hann.
Concurring opinions in the Pentagon Papers Case point the way toward the recognition of Hann
Advocacy as an unprotected subject of speech activity. Justice Brennan reaffinned explicitly that
"[n]o one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting
service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops."
/d. at 726 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931». For a
discussion of the media's view of the New York Times case, see BRUCE W. SANFORD, DON'T SHOOT
THE MESSENGER 154-156 (1999); Cass Sunstein, Is Violent Speech a Right?, THE AMERICAN
PROSPECT 35 (1995) (arguing that "narrow restrictions on speech that expressly adovcate illegal,
murderous violence in messages to mass audiences probably should not be taken to otTend the First
Amendment").
52. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
53. See SuI/ivan, 376 U.S. at 265 ("The test is not the fonn in which state power has been
applied but, whatever the fonn, whether such power has in fact been exercised."). In Sullivan, the
Supreme Court held that "[w]hat a state may not constitutionally bring about by means of a
criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel," because the fear of civil

liberty might be "markedly more inhibiting than the fear of prosecution under a criminal statute."
Id. at 277.
54. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
55. Id. at 266-68; see, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663,669 (1991) (noting the
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chilling effect on the exercise of free speech, 56 the Court permitted recovery
because of society's interest in protecting individuals' reputation from harm,
even when individuals voluntarily place themselves in the public spotlight.
In Sullivan, the Supreme Court effectively constitutionalizedstate tort law to
prohibit the imposition of civil liability for good faith criticism of public
officials. 57 In subsequent cases, however, the Supreme Court has made clear
that false speech, as such, does not enjoy any special First Amendment
protection in its own right. 58 . Careful consideration of Sullivan and its progeny59
demonstrates that the free speech clause of the First Amendment displaces
"well-established line of decisions holding that generally applicable laws do not offend the First
Amendment simply because of their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its
ability to gather and report the news.").

56. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 300 (Goldberg, J, concurring). To achieve protection of free
speech, the Court imposed on public officials a heavy burden of proving actual malice to make it
difficult to reach, much less persuade, a jury. Id. If such public officials could be persuaded not to
sue, the~edia would be spared the cost of defending questionable claims, and the corresponding
pressure to tone down or even disregard provocative stories that might spawn litigation. Some
commentators believe that the New York Tmes standard is not sufficiently protective of the press
and have suggested that such libel cases be barred or made even more difficult to pursue. See
Anthony Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to "the Central
Meaning of the First Amendment, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1983) (urging absolute immunity
should apply at least for published criticism of the official conduct of public officials); William W.
Van Alstyne, First Amendment Limitations on Recovery from the Press - An Extended Comment
on "the Anderson Solution", 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 793 (1984) (supporting limitations on
damage awards in libel cases); David A. Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEX. L.
REV. 422, 435-36 (1975) (discussing why New York Tim~s standard failed to achieve goal of
reducing defense costs); BRUCE W. SANFORD, DoN'T SHOOT THE MESSENGER 176-179 (1999)
(discussing some of the hanns that have resulted from the New York Times holding for the media).
57. See generally Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 254. The court did not decide whether tort liability, in
general, is the kind of abridgement of speech that requires First Amendment scrutiny. See Davis.
A. Anderson, Torts. Speech and Contracts, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1499, 1505 (1997).
58. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) ("There is no such thing as a
false idea. However, pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the
conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.").
59. See Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (holding that a public figure must
show actual malice); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (holding that when the
subject of a libelous statement is a private figure, the defendant must at least be at fault in order for
liability to be imposed).
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traditional common' law tort principles only when necessary to protect
democratic deliberation. 60 Because Hann Advocacy does not advance the
process of democratic deliberation, it should be deemed outside the scope of the
Sullivan rule.
Based on the Sullivan holding that tort remedies are available to plaintiffs
hanned by certain types of speech, numerous plaintiffs have tried to hold
publishers liable for their works which incite violence or lawlessness. 61 Few
have prevailed. 62 One major reason is that a majority of the lower federal courts
60. See SuI/ivan, 376 U.S. at 270 (asserting a "profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasant sharp attacks on government and public
officials. ").
61. See, e.g., Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,485
U.S. 959 (1988) (reversing jury's award of damages in a wrongful death action against a magazine
publisher for adolescent's death allegedly caused by article which described practice of autoerotic
asphyxia); Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536 N.E.2d 1067 (Mass. 1989) (motion for
summary judgment granted in wrongful death action by father of boy slain by person who had just
seen the film The Warriors, which depicted scenes of gang violence, dismissed despite the fact that
the perpetrator uttered a line from the film while committing the homicide); McCollum v. CBS,
Inc., 202 Cal. App. 3d 989 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (granting motion to dismiss in wrongful death suit
against Ozzy Ozboume record that included song Suicide Solution, which exhorted suicide);
DeFilippo v. National Broad. Co., 446 A.2d 1036, 1038, 1042 (R.I. 1982) (motion for summary
judgment granted in wrongful death suit brought by parents of a deceased minor against NBC after
their son hanged himself while imitating a hanging stunt he observed on the Johnny Carson Show);
Disney Productions v. Shannon, 276 S.E.2d 580 (Ga. 1981) (motion for summary judgment
granted in' suit by parents of child partially blinded during an attempt to perform balloon trick
demonstrated on a Disney television program); Niemi v. National Broad. Co., Inc., 126 Cal. App.
3d 488 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1108 (1982) (judgment of non-suit granted at
trial when plaintiff admitted that the film, Born Innocent, did not incite the unlawful behavior
which injured the plaintiff); Zamora v. CBS, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (granting
motion to dismiss in suit involving fifteen-year-old against television networks for violent
programming that allegedly caused him to commit criminal acts).
62. See, e.g., Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997) (permitting wrongful
death suit against publisher of How to Hire a Hit Man under Brandenburg's incitement standard);
Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 968 F.2d 1110 (II th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
1071, 1072 (1993) (applying commercial speech doctrine to advertisement in Soldier of Fortune
magazine offering "gun for hire; all jobs considered" and permitting wrongful death suit to
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have applied the Brandenburg test when detennining whether a publisher or
author who advocates criminal acts should be liable for resulting hann. 63
Applying the Brandenburg test, courts have refused to hold publishers liable
because the incitement was not explicit, warnings were included, or no "clear
and present danger" of imminent injury existed. 64 Although the Brandenburg
test properly protects political speech advocating the overthrow of the
government or other abstract promotion of lawlessness, it has proven to be
overprotective of non-political speech that directly facilitates physical harm
against others. 65
The Supreme Court has not addressed the standard applicable to nonpolitical speech that advocates hann to others. 66 Nevertheless, two relatively
recent United States Circuit Court of Appeals cases have established two very
different approaches to claims that such speech enjoys broad First Amendment
protection. 6 7
1. Rice v. Paladin Enterprises. Inc.
Rice v. Paladin Enterprises. Inc. 68 is· one of the few cases holding that the

First Amendment does not pose a bar to a fmding of civil liability against a
publisher. 69 The Rice case arose out of the brutal murders committed by James
Perry, a contract killer,70 In preparation for these murders, Perry closely

proceed); Norwood v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 1397 (W.O. Ark. 1987)
(pennitting action against publisher of "gun for hire" advertisement); Wei rum v. RKO Gen., Inc.
539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975) (pennitting wrongful death suit against radio station where a promotional
contest repeatedly urged and encouraged driving in dangerous manner to intercept another OJ
driving around in a marked car to collect a cash prize).

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
See id.
See supra note 50.
See supra notes 50-51.
See Rice, 128 F.3d 233; Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987).
Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1515

68.
(1998).

69.

Id. For an interesting discussion to some of the background to the Rice case, see RODNEY A.

SMOLLA, OELIBERATE INTENT (1999).

70.

Rice, 128 F.3d at 239. Lawrence Hom had hired James Perry to kill his ex-wife and his

eight-year old quadriplegic son, in order to inherit over $1 million awarded to his son in a lawsuit
for the accident, which caused the son's paralysis. Id. James Perry murdered Mildred Hom, her
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followed the directions contained in Hit Man: A Technical Manual for
Independent Contractors 71 and How to Make a Disposable Silencer, Vol II, 72
publications of Paladin Enterprises, Inc. ("Paladin"). On discovering the pivotal
role that these books played in the execution of this crime, the victims' families
sued Paladin 73 for tortious aiding and abetting and civil conspiracy. 74
Applying the standard set forth in Brandenburg v. Ohio,75 the district court

son Trevor, and Trevor's private nurse by shooting the two women through the eyes and strangling
the helpless boy. Perry v. Maryland, 686 A.2d 274, 277 (Md. 1996). Perry received the death
sentence. Id. at 295.
71. REx FERAL, HIT MAN: A TECHNICAL MANUAL FOR INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS (Paladin
Press 1983). For example, Perry meticulously followed the books' directions and advice about how
to solicit for prospective clients in need of murder-for-hire services, how to handle and use an
AR-7 rifle and drill out the serial number, how to construct a silencer and shoot at an optimal
distance to "insure quick and sure death," how to disassemble the weapon and change its rifling to
prevent its ballistics from matching the bullets left behind in the victims, how to make the crime
scene look like a burglary, how to dispose of the weapon and any stolen goods in pieces along the
roadway, and how to use a rental car to get away from the crime scene undetected. See Rice, 940
F. Supp. 836, 839-40 (D. Md. 1996). If Perry had followed the Hit-Man instructions a little more
closely, he may not have ended up in his current predicament. Despite the precautions Perry took
to avoid detection, police placed him in Rockville the day of the murders because he checked into
a motel near the scene - using his real name and address. Perry, 686 A.2d at 277. The author of
the book is actually a woman who has remained unidentified. See 60 Minutes (CBS Television
Broadcast, Mar. 2, 1997) (interviewing Peter Lund).
72. How TO MAKE A DISPOSABLE SILENCER (Paladin Enters. 1983).
73. The families sued Paladin Press and its president, Peter Lund. Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 838.
Many amici curiae briefs were filed in support of the defendant, including ones from media
corporations, the ACLU, the Association of American Publishers, the Newspaper Association of
America, and the Society of Professional Journalists. Id.
74. Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 838. The plaintiffs also sought damages based on theories of
negligence and strict liability. /d. The complaint alleged that Paladin aided and abetted Perry in
the commission of these murders through the publication of its books with their explicit
instructions on how to commit and cover-up a contract murder. Id. Neither the District Court nor
the Fourth Circuit addressed these arguments. See Rice, 128 F.3d at 233; Rice, 940 F. Supp. at
836.

75.

Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). The Rice court found that three elements must be met
under the Brandenburg test to prohibit Paladin's publication of the manuals. See Rice, 940 F.
Supp. at 845-46. First, the manuals must advocate imminent lawless action. Id. at 845. Second,

HeinOnline -- 27 N. Ky. L. Rev. 95 2000

96

NORTHERN KENTUCKY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:1

granted Paladin's motion for summary judgment, holding that the First
Amendment barred recovery of damages. 76 The district court found that the
Paladin publications did not meet Brandenburg's stringent imminence
requirement, as the murders occurred at least a year after Perry purchased the
manuals. 77 In addition, the district court found that the books, although
"reprehensible and devoid of any significant redeeming social value,"78 did not
constitute incitement or a call to action,79 and that Paladin did not intend for
Perry to commit murder. 80 In granting Paladin's motion for summary judgment,
the court concluded that "[i]t is simply not acceptable to a free and democratic
society to limit and restrict creativity in order to avoid dissemination of ideas in
artistic speech whiCh may adversely affect emotionally troubled individuals. "81
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and
remanded. 82 In an opinion written by Judge Michael Luttig, the panel agreed

the books must have been intended to produce imminent lawless action. Id. Third, and last, the
books must have been likely to produce imminent lawless action. Id. Finding that none of these
requirements had been met, the court concluded that Paladin's speech could not be regulated or
prohibited by state tort law. Id. at 847.
76. Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 849.
77. See Rice, 940 F. Supp. 836,849 (D. Md. 1996).
78. Id. at 847.
79. See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 848-49 ("Nothing in the book says 'go out and commit murder
now!''').
80. See /d. at 847. However, Paladin stipulated that its intent and its marketing strategy was
intended to attract and assist criminals and would-be criminals who desired information and
instructions on how to commit crimes. /d. The court. however, found it highly relevant that
Paladin's catalogues and its books included prominent warnings such as "For Academic Use Only"
and a warning stating that certain laws made illegal the possession of certain guns and accessories
as well as stating that it is illegal to manufacture a silencer without a government license. Id. at
838-39 ("WARNING: IT IS AGAINST THE LAW TO manufacture a silencer without an
appropriate license from the federal government. There are state and local laws prohibiting the
possession of weapons and their accessories in many areas. Severe penalties are prescribed for
violations of these laws. Neither the author nor the publisher assumes responsibility for the use or
misuse of information contained in this book. For informational purposes only.").
81. Id. at 848 (stating specifically that the court declined to create a new category of unprotected
speech).
82. Rice, 128 F.3d at 26 7 (4th Cir. 1997) ("Paladin's astonishing stipulations, coupled with the
extraordinary comprehensiveness, detail, and clarity of Hit Man's instructions for criminal activity
and murder in particular, the boldness of its palpable exhortation to murder, the alarming power
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that the Brandenburg standard applied, but held that the First Amendment was
not a bar to finding Paladin civilly liable as an aider and abetter of Perry's triple
contract murder.83
The court held that the district court had misread
84
Brandenburg by failing to recognize that speech which "is tantamount to
legitimately proscribable nonexpressive conduct may itself be legitimately
proscribed, punished, or regulated.... "85 The Fourth Circuit emphasized that
Paladin's speech, because it was so detailed and methodical in its explanations
and instructions on how to plan, commit, and cover-up the crime of murder, was
not abstract speech and therefore received no First Amendment protection. 86
Throughout the opinion, the court repeatedly cited the "unprecedented"
stipulations by Paladin that it knew criminals would use its publication. 87 In the
and effectiveness of its peculiar fonn of instruction, the notable absence from its text of the kind of
ideas for the protection of which the First Amendment exists, and the book's evident lack of any
even arguably legitimate purpose beyond the promotion and teaching of murder, render this case
unique in the law. In at least these circumstances, we are confident that the First Amendment does
not erect the absolute bar to the imposition of civil liability .... "), cerro denied, 118 S. Ct. 1515

(1998).
265.

83.

Id. at

84.

Id. at 264. ("We cannot fault the district court for its confusion over the opinion in that case.

The short per curiam opinion in Brandenburg is, by any measure, elliptical.").
85. Id. In support of this, the court looked to two Supreme Court decisions. In Giboney v.
Empire Storage & Ice Co., the Supreme Court rejected "a First Amendment challenge to an
injunction forbidding unionized distributors from picketing to force an illegal business

arrangement." /d. at 243 (citing Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490). The court
next cited Brown v. Hartlage as a recent example of the Supreme Court's decision not to allow a
First Amendment defense when the activity sought to be protected involved illegal activity. Id. at
243,244 (citing Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 55 (1982)).
86. Id. at 256 (Hit Man is, pure and simple, a step-by-step murder manual, a training book for
assassins). The court further stated that the "speech act of providing step-by-step instructions for
murder ... so comprehensive and detailed that it is as if the instructor were literally present with
the would-be murderer not only in preparation and planning, but actual commission of, and followup to, the murder [has] ... not even a hint that the aid was provided in the fonn of speech that
might constitute abstract advocacy." Id. at 255.
87. Id. at 252-54 (reviewing Paladin's stipulations that it intended and had knowledge that Hit
Mall would be used by criminals to commit murder and that it had engaged in a marketing strategy
to attract and assist these individuals in the pursuit of this infonnation). Based on these
stipulations, the court held that a reasonable jury could find that Paladin possessed the requisite
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court's opinion, these stipulations proved a level of intent readily satisfying the
requirements of Maryland's civil aiding and abetting statute and the First
Amendment. 88
Applying a narrow line of criminal cases holding that the First Amendment
does not shield the defendants just because they used speech to commit crimes,
the Fourth Circuit concluded that the First Amendment posed no bar to civil
liability as well. 89 The court reviewed several cases involving tax protesters
who not only urged violations of the Internal Revenue Code, but also helped
people complete false returns. 90 It also noted a Ninth Circuit case in which the
federal government successfully prosecuted the publisher of drug-manufacturing
instructions for aiding and abetting, citing with approval the Ninth Circuit's
holding that the First Amendment "does not provide publishers a defense as a
matter of law to charges of aiding and abetting a crime.... "91 Although Judge
intent under Maryland law as well as the heightened First Amendment standard. Id. at 255.
88. Id. The Fourth Circuit found that their only instructional communicative "value" was the
illegitimate one of training persons how to murder and to engage in the business of murder for hire.
Id.

89. Rice, 128 F.3d at 245; see, e.g., United States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835, 842 (9th Cir. 1982)
(holding that the First Amendment does not provide publishers a defense as a matter of law to
charges of aiding and abetting a crime through the publication and distribution of instructions on
how to make illegal drugs); United States v. Mendelsohn, 896 F.2d 1183, 1186 (9th Cir. 1990)
(holding Brandenburg inapplicable to a conviction for conspiring to transport and aiding and
abetting the interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia, where defendants disseminated a
computer program that assisted others to record and analyze bets on sporting events; program was
"too instrumental in and intertwined with the performance of criminal activity to retain first
amendment protection."); United States v. Buttorff, 572 F.2d 619, 623-24 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding
that tax evasion speeches were not subject to Brandenburg because, although they did not "incite
the type of imminent lawless activity referred to in criminal syndicalism cases," they did "go
beyond mere advocacy of tax refonn."), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 906 (1978). Bllt see United States
v. Freeman, 761 F.2d 549, 551-52 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding general statements regarding the
unfairness of tax laws, as opposed to teaching of how to avoid tax laws, may constitute protected
speech), pert. denied, 476 U.S. 1120 (1986).
90. Rice, 128 F.3d at 245, 246 (citing United States v. Kelly, 769 F.2d 215, 217 (4th Cir. 1985)
(holding that the First Amendment offered no protection to speech which was not abstract in its
criticism of tax law, but instead urged people to file false tax returns, with the expectation that this
advice would be heeded».
91. Id. at 244 (citing United States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1982». In Barnett, the
Ninth Circuit held that the First Amendment did not provide publishers a defense as a matter of
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Luttig acknowledged that considerably less authority exists on the subject of
whether the government may subject such speech to civil penalty or make it
subject to private causes of action,92 the court assumed that it could do so
because the government could criminally prosecute the same speech without
running afoul of the First Amendment. 93

law to charges of aiding and abetting a crime through the publication of instructions of how to
make illegal drugs. Barnett, 667 F.2d at 842. The defendant was the publisher of an instruction
manual on how to manufacture the illegal drug known as PCP. Id. Another person obtained the
defendant's instruction manual and was caught in the act of manufacturing the illegal drugs. Id. at
838. The defendant was prosecuted for aiding and abetting the manufacture of PCP. Id. The
defendant argued that evidence seized at the crime scene should be suppressed because the
defendant had a First Amendment right to print the manual. Id. The Court stated "[t]o the extent,
however, that Barnett appears to contend that he is immune from search or prosecution because he
uses the printed word in encouraging and counseling others in the commission of a crime, we hold
.expressly that the First Amendment does not provide a defense as a matter of law to such conduct."
Id. at 843.
92. Compare Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) (applying the same "actual malice"
standard to both criminal libel prosecutions and private defamation actions) with New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Cf Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991)
(finding in civil promissory estoppel case that First Amendment does not bar liability for
newspaper's publication of confidential source's name); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co.,
433 U.S. 562 (1977) (holding that the First Amendment does not bar liability for common law tort
of unlawful appropriation of "right to publicity" where television station broadcast "human
cannonball" act in its entirety without plaintiffs authorization); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (rejecting First Amendment defense to copyright infringement
action against magazine for printing unauthorized presidential memoir excerpts).
93. Rice, 128 F.3d at 247. The court then identified two possible qualifications to this
conclusion. Id. at 247. The first involved a "heightened intent requirement" to prevent the
punishment or abolishment of innocent and lawfully useful speech. /d. The court detennined that
this exception does not apply when "those who would, for profit or other motive, intentionally
assist and encourage crime and then shamelessly seek refuge in the sanctuary of the First
Amendment." Id. at 248. The second qualification was that the First Amendment imposed similar
limitations on the imposition of civil liability for abstract advocacy as it would for the imposition
of criminal punishment for the same type of speech. Id. at 248-49. Because the court finnly
believed that Paladin's speech was "so comprehensive and detailed" in its narration and instruction
on murder, the speech, under no circumstances could be considered abstract advocacy, and
therefore this qualification was inapplicable. /d. at 249.
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The Fourth Circuit's analysis seems largely correct on the facts at bar: the
First Amendment should not protect an intentional effort to facilitate a crime. 94
For whatever reasons, Paladin's officers stipulated that this was their intent in
publishing the two books at issue. 95
The court's attempt to fit Brandenburg to these facts is somewhat less
• convincing. 96 Brandenburg 's imminence requirement mandates difficult,
almost theological intellectual acrobatics in order to reach instructional speech
that advocates harm to others. It would make more sense to simply find
Brandenburg inapplicable to the kind of speech activity at issue in Rice.
2.

Byers v. Edmondson

Less than six months after the Fourth Circuit's decision in Rice v. Paladin, a
Louisiana Court of Appeals relied on the Rice rationale in refusing to block a
civil lawsuit that sought to hold liable the producers and distributors of the film
Natural Born Killers for the damages suffered by Patsy Byers. 97 The Byers case
demonstrates the manner in which the Rice holding may be interpreted to reduce
the First Amendment's protection for a wide variety of violent speech, not just
murder manuals.
In March 1995, Sarah Edmondson and her boyfriend, Benjamin Darrus, after
repeated viewings of the movie Natural Born Killers. decided to act out various
portions of that movie. The two young people shot and killed a cotton gin
owner, and later shot Patsy Byers during their armed robbery of a convenience
store. 98 Byers, who was partially paralyzed by her wounds, brought a $20
million suit against Edmondson and Darrus,99 and against those responsible for

94.
95.
96.
97.

See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
Rice, 128 F.3d at 252.
Id. at 243-65.
See Byers v. Edmondson, 712 So. 2d 681 (La.

Ct. App. 1998), cert. denied. Time Warner
Entertainment Co. v. Byers, 119 S.Ct. 1143 (1999). Oliver Stone's 1994 movie, Natural Born
Killers, tells the tale of two young lovers, Mickey and Mallory, who murder Mallory's parents and
then continue on a three-month violent crime spree during which they murder 52 people, cause a
prison riot, and become national celebrites. See NATURAL BORN KILLERS (Warner Bros. 1994).
The movie has been blamed for a dozen or so "copy cat" murders in the United States and Europe.
See Michael Shnayerson, Natural Born Opponents, VANITY FAIR, July 1996, at 98.
98. See id. at 683. Mrs. Byers died of cancer in November 1997. Her family continues to
pursue her lawsuit.
99. Sarah Edmondson is currently serving a 35-year sentence for the attempted murder and
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the film, including the director, Oliver Stone. I 00
Byers contended the producers and distributors of Natural Born Killers
knew, intended and were substantially certain that the film would cause the type
of incitement to violence that Edmondson and Darrus carried out against her. 101
Additionally, Byers alleged that the media defendants negligently and/or
recklessly failed to minimize the film's violent content and glorification of
senseless violence. I02 She also asserted that the media defendants negligently
and/or recklessly failed to warn viewers of the "potential deleterious effects"
upon teenage viewers caused by repeated viewing of Natural Born Killers. 103
anned robbery of Patsy Byers. Her boyfriend, Benjamin Darrus, is serving a life sentence for the
murder of William Savage, a cotton gin manager, whom the couple gunned down in his office in
Mississippi the day before shooting Mrs. Byers. At the time of these incidents, both Edmondson
and Darrus were 18 years old.

100. See id. at 684 (the suit included Warner Brothers, Inc., Warner Home Videos, and Time
Warner Entertainment). Patsy Byers alleged that Edmondson and Darrus, after watching the movie

Natural Born Killers, desired to emulate the protagonists in the movie, and thus, Oliver Stone and
the other media defendants are responsible for the hann she suffered. See id. Byers' allegations
are not particularly novel. See infra note 62 (listing cases brought against media defendants on a
"copy cat" theory of liability). In fact, other courts that have considered "copy cat" cases (in which
plaintiffs blame the actions of their attackers on the media content that their attackers watched)
have consistently rejected them. See id.; see also MARC A. FRANKLIN AND DAVID A. ANDERSON,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON MASS MEDIA LAW 437-39 (1995) (describing examples of what the
authors call "how-to-do-it" cases involving physical hann allegedly caused by infonnation
contained in media messages).
101. See id. at 684-85 (enumerating the allegations against the media defendants). The Byers
complaint states, "Defendants are liable ... for producing a film ... which they intended ... would
cause or incite persons such as defendants Sarah Edmondson and Benjamin Darrus (via subliminal
suggestion or glorification of violent acts) to begin shortly after repeatedly viewing same, a crime
spree such as that which lead to the shooting of Patsy Ann Byers." Id. at 684.

102. See id. at 685.
103. See id. The dispute surrounding the viability of Byers' suit provides insight into the
conflicting views that even those within the entertainment and publishing industry have regarding
civil liability for their works. One of Edmondson's and Darrus' other victims was William Savage,
a good friend of John Grisham, the author of many successful legal thrillers. Mr. Grisham urged
the Louisiana court to hold the producers of Natural Born Killers liable under a products liability
theory. See Ben Elton, When Artists Must Take the Rap, SUNDAY TIMES - loNDON, July 28, 1996,
at B I. Oliver Stone, producer of Natural Born Killers, responded by asking whether Grisham

HeinOnline -- 27 N. Ky. L. Rev. 101 2000

102

NORTHERN KENTUCKY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27: 1

In response, the media defendants filed a peremptory exception raising the
objection of no cause of action. I 04 Specifically, the media defendants contended
that they owed no duty to the plaintiff to ensure that viewers of Natural Born
Killers would not imitate actions depicted in the fictional work. 105 Additionally,
the media defendants argued that the imposition of liability on the filmmakers
would violate the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. 106 The trial court
dismissed Byers' claims against the media defendants. I 07
The Louisiana Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed. I 08 The Byers
court found that the media defendants may have owed a duty to Byers and that
the First Amendment did not bar her suit. I 09 In addressing the duty question, the
court found that if Byers could prove that the media defendants intended that
viewers imitate the criminal conduct of the main characters in Natural Born
Killers, then the risk of harm would be "imminently foreseeable," I 10 justifying
the imposition of a duty upon the defendants to refrain from creating such a
film. I II The court specifically limited Byers' claims against the media
would "be happy to assume liability" if someone committed a revenge murder after reading
Grisham's novel A Time to Kill. See Sandra Davidson. Blood Money: When Media Expose Others
to Risk of Bodily Harm, 19 HASTINGS COMM/ENT. L. J. 225,239-40 (1997) (reviewing the dispute
between those who seek to hold the media liable for the harms it may have caused through violent
programs, and those who believe that the media is never the cause of the harm when individuals
decide to "copy cat" what they see or hear).
104. See id. at 684 (the peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action is similar
to a motion to dismiss).
105. See id.
106. The Byers' lawsuit is not the first attempt to bring claims against the producers and
distributors of Natural Born Killers. A Georgia court dismissed another lawsuit, which contained
similar allegations as those in Byers, on the grounds that the film could not meet the immediacy
requirement of Brandenburg. See S. Michael Kernan, Shollid Motion Pictllre Stlldios and
Filmmakers Face Tort Liability for the Acts of Individuals Who Watch Their Films? 21 HASTINGS
COMM/ENT. L. J. 695, 708 (1999) (discussing the Miller v. Warner Bros.. Inc. case in detail).
107. See id. at 685. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, "finding that the
law simply does not recognize a cause of action such as that contained in and asserted by Byers'
petition." Id. At this time, the Rice v. Paladin opinion had not yet been issued.
108. See id. at 691.
109. !d. at 689.
110. !d. at 688 (holding that "[i]f the intentional action allegations contained the petition can be
proven at trial, the imposition of a duty would be warranted.").
III. !d. In making this determination, the court principally relied on Weirum v. RKO Gen .. Inc ..
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defendants to those involving intentional torts, stating that because "mere
foreseeability or knowledge" that the film might be used for criminal purposes
would not support liability, Byers had to prove that the media defendants
intended for viewers to imitate the violent acts.112 The court then distinguished
several cases that refused to hold the media liable in similar "copy cat"
situations by stating that those cases were decided on summary judgment
motions, and therefore were inapplicable to this case where the dismissal was
based on the allegations of the complaint. I 13
After finding that the media defendants may have owed a duty to Byers, the
court next addressed the First Amendment arguments. Again, accepting Byers'
allegations as true, the court found that if Byers could prove that the media
defendants intended for viewers to imitate the violent acts in the film, then the
film would fall under Brandenburg's incitement exception, and would not be
protected by the First Amendment. I 14 Citing at length the Fourth Circuit's Rice
v. Paladin decision, I 15 the court found that the plaintiffs allegations that Oliver
Stone and his production company had intended to incite imminent lawless
action were sufficient to state a cause of action not barred by the First
Amendment. I 16
The Byers case further demonstrates the potential problems with the Rice v.
Paladin decision. I 17 By manipulating Brandenburg's imminence requirement
to apply to a murder manual situation, the Rice court opened the door for other
courts to apply Brandenburg in a similar, loose fashion. Unfortunately for the
media industry, the Byers opinion could apply more widely than Rice, not just to
permit lawsuits against those who produce and distribute violent instructional

539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975), a case holding a radio station liable for hanns caused by its listeners
whom the radio station had deliberately urged to speed in order to receive a prize.
112. [d. at 690-92.
113. [d. at 688-89.
114. [d. at 689.
liS. See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4 th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. ISIS
(1988). For a more detailed discussion of this case, see text and accompanying notes 68-96.
116. [d. at 690.
117. The Byers court could have avoided applying Rice v. Paladin because the two cases are so
very different. In Byers, the movie, Natural Born Killers, was intended to entertain movie
audiences, unlike the murder manual at issue in Rice, which was intended to train people how to
commit anti-social acts.
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manuals and videos, but to ultra-violent movies, I 18 and potentially to mystery
novel writers· and others who produce works that may discuss anti-social or
harmful concems. 119
Many commentators argue that both Rice and Byers are incorrect, but fail to
provide a standard for courts to apply when dealing with speech that instructs
an~ encourages harm to others.120 Such speech does. not deserve the level of
118. The Byers court does not guarantee that a plaintiff will be successful in bringing such "copy
cat" cases against media defendants, but may encourage other plaintiffs to file suit. See James v.
Meow Media, Inc., 2000 WL 359735 (W.O. Ky. 2000) (dismissing a $130 million lawsuit brought
by the families of the three children whom Michael Carneal murdered at Heath High School in
Paducah, Kentucky, against the makers and distributors of the film The Basketball Diaries,
alleging that Carneal was inspired, encouraged, or substantially assisted by that movie in gunning
down his classmates). The plaintiffs argued that their claims should not be dismissed because they
were similar to those asserted in Byers. Id. at *5. The James court rejected this argument, finding
that the Byers court permitted only the plaintiffs' intentional tort claims to proceed. Because the
James plaintiffs had alleged only negligence on the part of the media defendants, the court
dismissed their claims. Id. at *5.

119. See, e.g., RICHARD BACHMAN, RAGE (1977) (writing under the pen name "Richard
Bachman," Stephen King tells the story of a disturbed student who goes to class and shoots his
teacher and fellow classmates. The book was later made into the movie The Basketball Diaries).
Rage has been cited as a potential causal factor in several incidents of school violence. In 1996,
officials found a copy of the book in a student's bedroom after he had killed four people at his
junior high school. See Alex Fryre, School Violence Pervades Films, Books, and Music, SEATTLE
TIMES, Apr. 25, 1999, at A I (discussing several violent school events that allegedly were copied
from books and music depicting teenage angst).
120. See Keith C. Hauprich, A Triple Homicide, A Book Publisher, and the First Amendment:
How Will Rice v. Paladin Enterprises Inc. Impact the Entertainment and Media Industries?, 7
UCLA ENT. L. REV. 33 (1999) (arguing that if future courts liberally construe Rice, as the Byers
court did, "a Pandora's Box of liability for defendants in the entertainment industry may be
opened" and warning of potential censorship in the future but not recognizing the need to protect
the public); See S. Michael Kernan, supra note 106 (critiquing the Byers opinion for not analyzing
the speech element of the film and for failing to provide a clear test for liability but not suggesting
a method for courts to use when evaluating speech that advocates hann to others); Jeffery Haag, If
Words Could Kill: Rethinking Tort Liability in Texas for Media Speech that Incites Dangerous or
Illegal Activity, 30 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1421 (1999) (arguing that Texas courts should continue to
follow the Brandenburg standard and not permit tort liability for the publication of works that
promote hann to others but failing to realize the courts' manipulations of Brandenburg could
actually cause more restrictions on speech rather than less); Clay Calvert and Robert O. Richards,
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First Amendment protection offered by Brandenburg. Extending Brandenburg
to encompass such speech provides more protection than such speech merits
under the First Amendment. If a publisher knowingly seeks to facilitate conduct
which the legislature may constitutionally proscribe, the speech at issue should
itself be proscribable. This is not because the power of prohibiting conduct also
encompasses the lesser power of proscribing speech.121 Rather, it is because
speech that facilitates criminal conduct is itself proscribable - just as
conspiracies and solicitations may be criminalized and punished, speech akin to
a conspiracy or solicitation can be punished. Moreover, the proscription is not
the product of antipathy toward the speaker's ideological motivation, but rather a
prudent preventive measure to protect the public from harm. 122
III. THE DANGERS AND THE INADEQUACY OF THE BRANDENBURG TEST As
ApPLIED TO MEDIA VIOLENCE
Recent events have underscored the need to develop a new, approach to
speech that advocates harm to others. Investigators in the Oklahoma City
bombing prosecution discovered that one of the bombers, Timothy McVeigh,
had a "how-to" book by Paladin, as well as The Turner Diaries in his
possession.1 23 Earlier this year, a federal jury found that the operators of a web
site threatening physical harm to many abortion providers and listing their
names and addresses were liable under the Free Access to Clinic Entrances

New Millennium, Same Old Speech: Technology Changes, the First Amendment Issues Don't, 79

B.U.L. REV. 959 (1999) (arguing that new technologies may encourage people to censor speech
but failing to suggest ways to protect the public from speech that advocates harms to others, is
widely disseminated, and easily accessible by others).
121. Cf Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. V. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
The Supreme Court has plainly rejected this aspect of Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in
Posados. See Greater New Orleans Broadcasters' Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1923
(1999); 44 LiquorMart Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
122. For example, under a speech theory that permits liability for the advocacy of harm to others,
it does not make any difference whether the publisher of a manual on how to build bombs is a
white supremacist group, a pro-life organization, or a radical feminist group. All would be
responsible for actions taken as a result of their publication if the requisite intent, causation and
procedural burdens can be satisfied.
123. See James Bone, Murder Manual Firm Pays Out, THE TIMES OF LONDON, May 25, 1999
(discussing Timothy McVeigh's ownership of a Paladin Press bomb making book).
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ACt. 124

Moreover, the Anti-Defamation League and the Southern Poverty Law
Center have noted a marked increase in hate groups on the internet calling for
violent revolution against the government and advocating physical violence
against the members of various minority groups. 125
In response to the threat from hate groups and the easily accessible material

124. See Planned Parenthood of the ColumbialWiIIi~mette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life
Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1153-54 (D. Oregon 1999) (granting under FACE an injunction
prohibiting the publication of defendant's website and posters with the intent to threaten the
abortion providers and declaring that the court "totally reject[s] the defendants' attempt to justify
their actions as an expression of opinion or as a legitimate and lawful exercise of free speech in
order to dissuade the plaintiffs from providing abortion services."). Planned Parenthood and four
doctors who perform abortions brought suit against fourteen individuals and two organizations
alleging that they had threatened abortion providers through a series of posters and a web site, "the
Nuremberg files." Id. at 1130-34. One of the posters lists by name a "Deadly Dozen" of doctors
and highlights an indictment from the Nuremberg Trials declaring the Nazis who forced abortions
on East European and Jewish women were war criminals. Id. at 1131-32. On the website, the antiabortion organization had a wanted list of 200 doctors and abortion supporters, providing their
addresses, photos, license plate numbers and in at least one case, the names of their children and
the schools they attend. Id. Doctors who have been killed by alleged pro-lifers were crossed off
the wanted list. Id. Those who merely were wounded were shaded in gray. Id. On Feb. 2, a
federal jury awarded Planned Parenthood, and the other plaintiffs $107 million in damages. Id.
For an overview of the verdict and the surrounding controversy, see James C. Goodale, Can
Planned Parenthood Silence the Pro Life Website? 4/2/99 N:Y.LJ. 3 (discussing the potential
harm to the media resulting from the verdict in the Nuremberg Files case); Roxanne Guillory,
Abortion Rights Supporters Challenge Opponents' Dangerous, Deadly Tactics, NATIONAL Now
TIMES, April I, 1999 (presenting the arguments for restricting the anti-abortion speech against the
abortion providers).
125. See Raymond W. Smith, Civility Without Censorship: The Ethics of the Internet Cyberhate, 65 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 196 (Jan. 1999) (chairman of Bell Atlantic stating that
civil rights groups need to think of ways to meet the increasing threat from cyberhate on the
internet); Mark Potok, Hate Groups on the Rise; Internet Major Factor, Research Finds, JET,
March 2, 1999, at 19 (stating that "The Internet is allowing the White supremacy movement to
reach places it has never reached before - middle and upper middle-class, college-bound teens.")~
Explosion of Hate, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE (1988) (reporting on growth of hate groups in the
United States and their increasing use of the internet to attract followers); We love the Net, but we
hate you, NEW MEDIA AGE, July I, 1999, at 17 (discussing recent report by the Anti-Defamation
League which states that hate groups are steeping up their use of the internet to target young
recruits).
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providing directions on how to commit various violent acts, some politicians and
commentators have called for government censorship of such speech. The
Department of Justice, concerned about the proliferation of bomb-making
instructions on the internet, filed a brief in support of the Rice family in the
Paladin case, arguing that Brandenburg should not apply to protect this speech,
and that even if it does, "imminent," as used in Brandenburg, does not really
mean "imminent."126 Moreover, Congressman Henry Hyde, chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee,' proposed "The Child Safety and Violence
Prevention Act" that recommended banning "obscenely violent materials" to
minors. In More recently, the school shootings have lead many to question the
126. DEPARTMENT Of JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE AVAILABILITY OF BOMBMAKING INFORMATION, THE
EXTENT TO WHICH ITS DISSEMINATION IS CONTROLLED By FEDERAL LAW, AND THE EXTENT TO
WHICH SUCH DISSEMINATION MAY BE SUBJECT TO REGULATION CONSISTENT WITH THE FIRST
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1997) ("[W]here it is foreseeable that the
publication will be used for criminal purposes, the Brandenburg requirement that the facilitated
crime be "imminent" should be of little, if any, relevance"). The Department's position is
somewhat bewildering; if "imminent" does not have a strong temporal connotation, one is hard
pressed to make sense of the Brandenburg opinion - or, for that matter, subsequent opinions such
as Hess and Claiborne. Id. One commonly cited dictionary defines "imminent" as meaning
"likely to happen without delay," "impending," and "threatening." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD
DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 726 (College Edition 1957). The Deparment's position
- not unlike the Rice opinion itself - ignores the core meaning of "imminent" in order to find the
Brandenburg test .satisfied. The problem with this approach is that watering down or eliminating
the. imminence requirement opens the door to a "bad tendency" interpretation of the clear and
present danger test - an approach that sanctions relatively broad, censorship of unpopular political
minorities. See generally Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
127. See The Child Safety and Youth Violence Prevention Act of 1999, H.R. 1501 (prohibiting
the sale of "extremely sexual or violent material that is not protected by the First Amendment" to
minors and imposing felony investigations and possible jail terms on retailers of such material if
they sold, loaned, or exhibited sexually explicitly or violent material to minors); see also, Eric
Pianin, Juliet Eilperin, House GOP Split Bill on Violence: Tactic May Weaken Gun Curbs, Allow
Foclls on Hollywood, WASHINGTON POST, June IS, 1999, at AI (discussing Hyde Amendment to
Juvenile Crime Bill that proposed tough new restrictions on the entertainment industry as a method
to control new wave of violence among school-aged children and prevent their access to sexual and
violent materials); Bill Holland, HOllse Defeats Cultural Legislation, BILLBOARD, June 26, 1999
(noting the defeat of Senator Hyde's proposal and discussing the other statutes still pending to
regulate violence on the internet, television and movies); Robert MacMillan, Sen. Hatch Joins
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role of the media in encouraging youth violence. 128
The federal courts' current application of the Brandenburg test to speech that
advocates harm does not strike the proper balance when the speech at issue
advocates lawless behavior in a manner that does not necessarily cause any
imminent danger. 129 For example, in Rice, the Fourth Circuit had to engage in
severe manipulations of the Brandenburg test to establish liability for books that
clearly are far removed from the type of speech at issue in Brandenburg. The
Rice court does not even try, and possibly could not, explain how a book
purchased and read more than one year prior to the date when a reader followed
its instructions could be viewed as inciting "imminent" lawless action.130
Anti-Online Violence Crnsade, NEWBYTES, May 5,1999 (discussing proposals by Senator Hatch to
implement more safeguards to protect children from damaging thoughts and images in popular
media, particuhirly those children receive over the internet). For a further discussion of the
similarity between obscenity and violence, see KEVIN SAUNDERS, VIOLENCE AS OBSCENITY
(1999) (arguing that violence is at least as obscene as sex and therefore should face similar
prohibitions). A recent article in the Ladies Home Journal shows just how easily bomb-making
material is on the internet. See Cheryl White, My Son Built a Bomb, 114 LADIES HOME JOURNAL
36 (March 1997) (discussing author's son's access 10 internet site concerning how to build a bomb
and his resulting injuries after he attempted to build and detonate it).
128. See Faye Fiore and James Gerstenzang, Clinton Opens Entertainment Violence Inquiry, L.A.
TIMES, June 2, 1999, at A I (noting that President Clinton ordered a $1,000,000 federal inquiry into
the entertainment industry'S marketing of violent films to children); Faye Fiore & Melissa Healy,
Clinton Urges Hollywood To Cut Violence, L.A. TIMES, May II, 1994, at A I (noting Clinton's
recent effort to have the Surgeon General prepare a report on youth violence, including the effects
of the news media).
129. A "how to" guide might not motivate a person to commit a crime, unlike a fiery speech ("on
to the Bastille!"). Properly understood, Brandenburg's imminence requirement relates to the
probable persuasiveness of the speech. Harm Advocacy, on the other hand, is not necessarily
meant to persuade, it is meant to assist or facilitate. The temporal relationship between the
distributor of Harm Advocacy and hann occurring could be quite temporally attentuated. If courts
continue to apply Brandenburg to Harm Advocacy, they will either have to fudge the imminence
requirement or find the speech protected. The fonner presents an unacceptable risk to unpopular
political speech that includes abstract calls to anns, the latter imposes unduly high costs on the
victims of Harm Advocacy.

130. The "imminence" required for the Brandenburg test is speech that causes an "unthinking,
immediate, lawless action." See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Only in these
situations is the government pennitted to regulate incitement to illegal action because few other
options are available to prevent the lawless action, as there is no time for reasoned debate. For a
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Because the Brandenburg test was stretched in this manner, publishers and
authors now fear that the federal courts have opened the floodgates of liability
for works of fiction. Moreover, hyperbolic political speech also seems to be in
danger of losing its protected status.
Clearly, such an application of the Brandenburg test undermines the
protection the First Amendment should provide to abstract political speech; and
could easily chill artistic and literary speech. Yet, the imposition of liability on
the facts at issue in Rice seems appropriate because "society's interest in
compensating injured parties [and] the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First
Amendment"131 should not be incompatible goals.
Because instructional speech advocating harm is highly technical, it has little
if any expressive value, and because it not only advocates, but also directly
facilitates the commission of crimes and intentional torts, it has little, if any,
political or socially redeeming value. As a category of speech, therefore, it is
particularly dangerous and not particularly valuable. More importantly, like
other categories of unprotected speech, this category is particularly likely to
result in severe harms to innocent third parties. 132 The state clearly has a very
strong interest in safeguarding the lives of its citizens. 133 In the general calculus
further critique of the Brandenburg imminence requirement as applied to "how to" manuals, see
KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIMES, & THE USES OF LANGUAGE 115 (1989).
131. See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 836, 840 (D. Md. 1996). On May 21, 1999,
the Rice case settled. Paladin's insurance company agreed to a multi-million dollar compensation
payment to the families. Paladin also agreed to take Hit Man otT the market. See SMOLLA, sllpra
note 69 at 272.
132. See Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Condllct and the First Amendment: In Defense
of Clear and Present Danger, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1159, 1176-77 (1982) (,,[IJf a speaker so intends,
advocacy which does not 'directly' urge unlawful conduct may nevertheless be 'directed' to
bringing about such conduct."). BlIt see Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, III (1973) (stating that
"[wJe'lI take the fucking street later," is not advocating imminent danger because the result will not
occur for an indetinite period of time).
133. See, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979) (noting that state may not
punish publication of lawfully obtained truthful information "absent a need to further a state
interest of the highest order."); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 700 (1972) (noting that
government has compelli'1g interest in securing safety of persons and property of citizens); Herceg
v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1028-29 (5th Cir. 1987) (Jones, J., dissenting) ("The
interest in protecting life is recognized specitically for first amendment purposes and, analytically
can be no less important than the interest in reputation. . .. [PJrotect[ingJ society from loss of life
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of competing interests, the government's interest in protecting the lives and
limbs of its citizens outweighs whatever slight social value inherent in such
speech. Additionally, the risk that the government will suppress unpopular
viewpoints or cultural minorities is, at best, remote. To better balance society's
interest in protecting its citizens from criminal activities, the federal courts
should create a new First Amendment speech category. 134

IV. CONCLUSION
When speech poses a significant public danger, the value of that speech may
outweigh the threat that speech poses to society. There is no doubt that the state
has a strong interest in preventing speech that will cause a crime, particularly
crimes involving serious bodily injury or death. Because of the value which
society places on the freedom of speech, however, the tests developed to avoid
government censorship of the speech activities of unpopular minorities properly
place a high burden on the government to justify imposing liability for the
consequences of speech activity. That said, a high burden in theory should not
prove to be an insurmountable burden in practice. 135

and limb, [is] a legitimate, indeed, compelling, state interest.").

134. See S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., supra note 10, at 1165
(discussing the need for the creation of a new category of speech to better regulate speech that
advocates harm to others while not diluting the protection for political advocacy under
Brandenburg). See also Kent Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, AM. BAR. FON. RESEARCH J. 647,
739 (1980) (suggesting that any "approach to criminal prohibitions that gives adequate protection
to speech must be categorial."). Professor Greenawalt suggests categorizing speech by the type of
utterance: ordinary expressions of fact and value (high level of protection), utterances which are
strongly situation altering (low-level of protection), and action-inducing encouragements (middle
level of protection). /d. The level of protection afforded the speech varies with the type of
utterance, whether it was said in public or private, and whether it is ideological or not. Id. at 739.
As Professor Greenawalt recognizes, however, some purely factual utterances are worth regulating.
/d. at 741 (discussing speech concerning how to make·a bomb or the location of troops). See also
David Crump, Camouflaged Incitement: . Freedom of Speech. Communicative Torts. and
Borderland of the Brandenburg Test, 29 GA. L. REV. I, 46 (1994) ("It was precisely because
Brandenburg used the •categorical , or 'unprotected utterance' approach that it improved protection
for the freedom of speech over the excessively loose balancing in cases such as Dennis.").
135. See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) ("Finally, we wish to dispel the
notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact.' The unhappy persistence of both the
practice, and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this country is
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Recent events conclusively demonstrate the need for government to impose
some of the costs of harmful instructional speech on those who propagate it.
The victims of those who use directions intended to facilitate harm should not be
denied a meaningful remedy on the theory that the First Amendment privileges
the instructions or advocacy of a de facto accomplice before the fact. When
cases arise that meet reasonably speech-protective standards of liability, courts
must be willing and able to impose liability.

an unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified from acting in response to it.");
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (noting that a plaintiff may still
succeed even under the clear and convincing evidence standard).
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